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This paper aims to study the effect of privatization on capital structure decisions, 
taking into account industry characteristics and capital structure variations across industries. 
A differences-in-differences model was applied to capture the effects of capital structure 
derived from the privatization. The results suggest that there is no evidence that leverage 
ratios are affected by the process of privatization. We then conduct a deeper analysis for 
Poland, a country engaged in a large scale privatization program in a short time period, and 
find different results. For Polish privatized firms, there is a significant evidence of increases 
in the debt ratios after privatization. Regarding the industry component of this paper, results 
suggest that firms in capital intensive industries have higher levels of leverage derived from 
the privatization. 
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O objetivo desta dissertação é analisar o efeito das privatizações nas decisões de 
estrutura de capital das empresas, tendo em consideração as diferentes características que 
cada indústria apresenta e variações na estrutura de capital entre indústrias. Para capturar os 
efeitos da estrutura de capital ao longo do tempo, foi aplicado um modelo de diferenças-das-
diferenças. Os resultados mostram que não há evidência de que os rácios de dívida são 
afetados pelo processo de privatização. Posteriormente, foi feita uma análise mais profunda 
para Polónia, um país alvo de um programa de privatização em larga escala num curto espaço 
de tempo e foram encontrados resultados diferentes. Para empresas polacas, existe evidência 
de um aumento do rácio de dívida, após a privatização. Relativamente à componente 
indústria, abordada neste estudo, os resultados sugerem que empresas baseadas em indústrias 
intensivas em capital terão níveis mais altos de dívida, após a privatização. 
 
Classificação JEL: G32; L33  
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This study aims to relate the concept of capital structure with the subject of 
privatization, with the intent of analyzing the specificities of different industries and how 
firms’ capital structure decisions are affected, post-privatization. We also take advantage of 
an additional analysis on Polish privatizations to assess our findings in a context of a massive 
program of privatizations in a short-time period. 
Over the last decades, privatizations gained predominance in terms of the common 
policies carried out by countries worldwide, because of three main reasons (Vickers and 
Yarrow, 1988): i) contribution to reduction of public deficit, given by the income generated 
by the sale of the privatized firms; ii) increased efficiency of the privatized firms; iii) 
increased opportunities for redistribution of income and wealth, as privatization allows the 
easier access to capital markets. Governments are increasingly resorting to privatization 
programs because of the three reasons above and also because, over the years, there is proof 
of successful privatization policies that boosted countries’ economies (Gilroy and Moore, 
2013). 
Previous literature studies the relationship between privatization and capital structure 
and in general, it documents that following the process of privatization leverage ratios 
decrease (Boubakri and Cosset, 1998; Arcas and Bachiller, 2008; Chahyadi, 2008). 
Traditionally, state-owned firms have higher levels of leverage because their only access to 
equity is through retained earnings and capital injections from the government (Ferreira, 
2012). 
 Despite the contributions to the literature, few studies have investigated the influence 





privatization. Hall et al. (2000) studied the relationship between the determinants of capital 
structure for small and medium firms from the UK and industry effects and how these 
determinants’ effect on long and short-term debt would differ across industries. Nevertheless, 
this paper does not cover the topic of privatizations and their impact on capital structure. 
To perform this study, we gathered a list of privatized firms from the Privatization 
Barometer and accounting data from the Amadeus Bureau Van Dijk database for private 
firms and from Bloomberg for publicly traded firms. The sample runs from 2006 through to 
2015 and contains 574 firm-year observations from 67 privatized firms based in 18 countries 
and classified in 10 different industries. 
Our results suggest that there is no evidence for the process of privatization to be 
relevant to explain capital structure decisions, except when firms are inserted in a large-scale 
privatization plan. Poland is an example of a privatization program launched by the 
government during our period of study and therefore, a separate test was performed on Polish 
firms. When tested alone, we found evidence of an increase of leverage, after privatization. 
We did not find statistical difference on levels of debt when comparing the type of ownership 
and the type of privatization. Industry specificities are relevant to explain capital structure 
variations across industries (Myers, 1984) and the findings in this study support this 
conclusion. Firms in industries that are capital intensive tend to have higher levels of 
leverage, following privatization. 
 These outcomes make a contribution to the literature in a sense that they suggest that, 
when governments interfere on privatizations, through the implementation of privatization 
programs at a country level, this approach may be relevant to explain firms’ capital structure 





The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Section 2 contains previous 
literature on the topic of capital structure and privatization. Section 3 presents the research 
hypotheses and the data. Section 4 covers the methodology approached in this paper. Section 
























2 Literature Review 
2.1 Privatization 
Privatization is a term that has two different meanings. Firstly, it corresponds to the 
process of transferring full or partial firm ownership from a government organization to a 
privately owned entity. Secondly, a definition that is widely accepted is that privatization 
occurs when a publicly traded company is bought by a private group of investors, making it 
no longer listed on the stock exchange. Savas (2000) describes privatization as the “act of 
reducing the role of government or increasing the role of the private institutions of society in 
satisfying people’s needs”. The focus on this paper is on the first definition described above. 
There are various types of privatization strategies, as suggested by Eaton (1989), but 
Megginson et al. (2004) state that most frequently, governments choose between three forms: 
i) the asset sales method, where the government sells company assets (typically through an 
auction) to a small group of investors; ii) through share issue (SIPs), in which equity shares 
are sold in the public stock markets; iii) through vouchers, that represent part ownership in 
formerly state-owned firms and that are distributed to all citizens for free or at a very low 
price. The authors added that SIPs are the largest and most economically important 
privatizations, although governments that have less state control over the economy tend to 
go through asset sales.  
As indicated before, privatization can be full or partial, in the sense that the 
government can transfer the entirety of the ownership to the private sector or not. This 
ownership transfer to the private sector is complete, different from a public-private 
partnership, where a concession contract is agreed upon between the public and the private 





Renneboog, 2016). Gupta (2005) claims that the majority of privatization programs of 
significant size start with partial privatization, in which only non-controlling shares of firms 
are sold in the stock market. Under the same conditions, Sheshinski and López-Calva (1998) 
show evidence that fully privatized firms should perform better than partially privatized 
firms.  
Empirical studies, such as D’ Souza and Megginson (1999), Boubakri and Cosset 
(1998), found that privatized firms had significant increases in profitability, sales, operating 
efficiency and dividend payments combined with a substantial decrease in leverage ratios. 
Harper (2002) suggests that in more stable and developed economic and financial markets, 
the benefits that come with privatization are amplified.  
Chahyadi (2008) and Arcas and Bachiller (2008) investigated the capital structure 
determinants for privatized firms. The authors found that, similarly to other studies, firms are 
less leveraged following privatization. Chahyadi (2008) added that privatized firms have a 
target capital structure and it does not change randomly over time. According to Borisova 
and Megginson (2011), privatizing firms face a higher cost of debt as state ownership 
diminishes because bond investors could demand higher spreads, especially if the process of 
privatization occurs through several phases. This may explain why firms’ leverage ratios 
suffer a decline after privatization. 
Ownership in firms that were privatized has a major role on their performance post-
privatization (D’ Souza et al., 2005). According to Boubakri and Cosset (1998), private 
owners that are more focused on profits and carry out new investments that increase output 
and employment are more common in privatized firms, and as a result, efficiency improves 





efficiency gains from the change in ownership structure in competitive sectors, given that 
those sectors have less government controls on prices and quantities. From previous studies 
there is evidence that, in part, the effect of privatization is caused by new human capital. 
Boycko et al. (1996) developed a model that could explain the increased efficiency of 
privatized firms. The authors concluded that privatization is more effective when combined 
with a tight monetary policy and the presence of outside investors rather than managers also 
increases efficiency. Frydman et al. (1999) observed that, in the context of Central Europe, 
privatization has no effect on any performance measure when firms are controlled by 
managers, as opposed to outside investors. This result can be explained by the influence that 
communism had on the market economy of the region.  
D’Souza et al. (2005) show that employment after privatization and foreign 
ownership are negatively correlated. Azmat et al. (2011) studied the relationship between the 
process of privatization and the labour’s share. They came to the conclusion that privatization 
is the reason for a decline, on average, of the labour’s share in 20%, in OECD countries, 
mainly due to the lower number of jobs.  
Carter (2013) proposed that, the more important industries are to a country’s economy 
and social welfare, the less likely firms from these industries will be privatized. Harper 
(2002) brings evidence that, after privatization, firms and industries that have lower fixed 
cost structures tend to have better performance results than other industries.  
 
2.2 Capital Structure 
Capital structure can be defined as the way a company finances its operations. There are 





In the words of Myers (2001), “capital structure attempts to explain the mix of securities and 
financing sources used by corporations to finance real investment”. 
When it comes to capital structure, one cannot neglect the importance that Modigliani 
and Miller (1958) had by being pioneers in deepening the research on this matter. In their 
seminal article, they introduced two propositions that lead to the conclusion that there is no 
such thing as an optimal capital structure. Assuming perfect capital markets (non-existence 
of taxes, no transaction or bankruptcy costs), choosing the amount of debt and equity is 
irrelevant for the value of the firm, hence the “irrelevance theory”. Years later, Modigliani 
and Miller (1963) made a correction on the previous article and introduced taxes. The authors 
reached the conclusion that, taking advantage of the tax benefits when there is debt, firms’ 
value would increase if they financed themselves through debt rather than equity and 
therefore, firms can have an optimal capital structure. 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) set the foundation for many other research articles and 
also to one of the two main theories regarding capital structure: the “trade-off theory”. The 
theory is based on the idea that there is an optimal capital structure that maximizes the value 
of a company, by balancing the benefits of debt (interest tax shields) and its costs (costs of 
financial distress and agency costs of debt). Bradley et al. (1984) show that leverage is 
inversely related with costs of financial distress. Under the assumptions of imperfect capital 
markets and the possibility that a firm can go bankrupt, Scott (1976) proved that there is only 
one optimal capital structure. Other main component that is dealt with in this theory is the 
concept of agency theory. Firstly investigated by Jensen and Meckling (1976), this topic 
concerns the relationship between principals and agents in a business, in which there are 





Barbosa et al. (2012) claim that leverage and privatization are positively correlated, 
with this result being in line with the agency theory, as firms usually choose to increase the 
levels of leverage to discipline managers. Errunza and Mazumdar (2001) argue that if 
bankruptcy costs after privatization are high, firms may have to reduce their leverage levels, 
so that privatization has a positive effect on the firm. 
According to previous studies on this topic (e.g. Hovakimian et al., 2001; de Jong et 
al., 2011), the “trade-off theory” suggests that the leverage has a positive relationship with 
the size and profitability of the firm, the tangibility of assets, the use of taxes and also that 
high industry median leverage should bring more debt. When it comes to growth the 
prediction is that, due to increasing costs of financial distress, the relationship between this 
variable and leverage should be negative (Frank and Goyal, 2009). 
The second main theory is known as the “pecking order theory”. It was based on a 
study by Donaldson (1961) and then developed by Myers and Majluf (1984). This theory 
states that the cost of financing increases with asymmetric information between managers 
and outside investors and thus, firms will prefer internal financing to external financing, 
through retained earnings. When firms resort to external funds, the preferred source is debt 
over equity because of lower adverse selection costs. In addition to that, there is no target 
capital structure as the firms adapt their debt-to-equity ratio to their financing needs.  
Arcas and Bachiller (2008) mention that, according to the pecking order theory, the 
process of privatization has a negative effect on leverage because firms will prefer to use 
their own funds. 
Concerning the relationship between leverage and other variables that can exert some 





between leverage and size; leverage and profitability and leverage and tangibility of assets 
(Frank and Goyal, 2009). Opposing the “trade-off theory”, growth and leverage are positively 
related. Myers (2001) claims that the “pecking order theory” may explain why larger and 
more profitable firms use less debt; due to the fact that these firms have more internal 
financing available to apply in other investments. 
Harris and Raviv’s article (1991) comprises several theories, addressed in previous 
years, about capital structure and, consequently, various results that are summarized. From 
the compilation of articles, the results lead to believe that the “pecking order theory” is a 
strong predictor on firms’ capital structure decisions. Myers and Shyam-Sunder (1999) argue 
that the “pecking order theory” explains well the financing decisions, based on their global 
sample of mature firms. According to Graham and Harvey (2001), CFO’s tend to rely on 
both trade-off and pecking order theories for the capital structure decisions. Hovakimian et 
al. (2001) and Abe de Jong et al. (2010) both suggest that, while the “pecking order theory” 
describes well the firms’ issue decisions, the “static tradeoff theory” is better in what regards 
repurchase decisions. 
Regarding the influence that industries have on capital structure, Talberg et al (2008) 
demonstrate that there is a major difference on the capital structure, depending on the industry 
a company is inserted. Myers (1984) argues that because the asset type, asset risk and 
requirements for external funds are different from industry to industry, this will lead to 
different average debt ratios across industries, if the theory is correct. Across industries, 
Degryse et al. (2012) claim that the effects of firm characteristics on leverage for each 
industry are mostly in line with the “pecking order theory”. Bradley et al. (1984) infer about 





similarities on those ratios intra-industry. Regarding the degree of industry competition, Fosu 
(2013) found evidence that industries inserted in more competitive environments have more 
benefits when they increase leverage. The author relies on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
to define industry competition. On the other hand, MacKay and Phillips (2005) affirm that 
the leverage ratio is higher and less dispersed in concentrated industries. The authors also use 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index to capture industry concentration. Higher values on this 
index indicate less competitive environments and more concentrated industries.   
Leverage decisions are largely influenced by the type of investments a firm 
undertakes (Long and Malitz, 1985). Gupta (1969) found a positive relation between the 
leverage ratio and fixed assets turnover, meaning that industries with a high level of fixed 
asset turnover tend to have more debt.  
Capital markets can also affect capital structure. Grinblatt and Titman (1998) suggest that 
the globalization of capital markets has contributed to a decrease of the cost of borrowing, 
encouraging the use of more debt. Faulkender and Petersen (2004) came to the conclusion 
that firms that have access to public debt markets tend to have higher leverage ratios than 
those that don’t have access. The authors also state that capital structure decisions are limited 
by the capital markets. Berger et al. (1997) examined the connection between capital structure 
decisions and managerial entrenchment. The authors find that entrenched managers can have 
an impact on firms’ capital structure decisions, with most of the results suggesting that 
leverage ratios decrease when the degree of managerial entrenchment rises. Regarding the 
managers’ characteristics, Antonczyk and Salzmann (2014) and Fauver and McDonald 
(2015) claim that firms in countries whose managers are more individual - i.e., that believe 





Fauver and McDonald (2015) added that risk aversion brings a significant and negative effect 
on firms’ debt ratio. 
 
 
3 Research Hypotheses, Data and Sample Selection 
3.1 Research Hypotheses 
This research aims to test the effect of the process of privatization on firms’ capital 
structure decisions, with the intent of analyzing the specificities of different industries, as the 
academic literature provides little information regarding these three main concepts. 
Research Question: How do different industry characteristics affect capital structure 
decisions, after privatization? 
Chahyadi (2008) documents that, when state-owned firms initiate a privatization 
process, their leverage ratios should decrease because there is an additional source of external 
capital, through equity. In addition to the reasons stated above in the literature review 
(Boubakri and Cosset, 1998; D’Souza and Megginson, 1999), this gives the motivation to 
test the first research hypothesis: 
H1: The level of leverage decreases after privatizations, for all privatized firms 
 
According to the academic literature (e.g. Megginson et al., 2004 D’Souza et al., 
2005), share issue privatizations (SIPs) are the largest so it is predictable that the largest firms 
go through this method of privatization, although the asset sale method is more frequent. If 





suggesting that their debt-to-equity ratio would be smaller. Therefore, the second research 
hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H2: The decrease in the level of leverage after privatizations is lower for privatizations 
through asset sale 
 
Regarding ownership structure, Borisova and Megginson (2011) found evidence for 
a decrease in the cost of debt for fully privatized firms, when compared to firms that are 
partially privatized, suggesting that there is easier access for fully privatized firms to finance 
their investments through debt. This outcome suggests our third hypothesis: 
 
H3: The decrease in the level of leverage after privatizations is higher for partially privatized 
firms 
 
Talberg et al. (2008) claim that each industry has its own reaction to changes in 
market conditions. Berman and Pfleeger (1997) added that some industries may be relatively 
immune to business cycles while others are very sensitive. The authors found evidence that 
industries such as consumer-related services, construction and manufacturing are mostly 
correlated with business cycles. According to Opler and Titman (1994), highly leveraged 
firms in industries experiencing economic declines tend to experience losses on profits, when 
compared to firms with lower leverage. Given that leverage variations are highly dependent 





inverse relationship between leverage and profitability (Titman and Wessels, 1988), the 
fourth research hypothesis is the following: 
H4: The decrease in the level of leverage after privatizations is less significant for firms 
inserted in industries mostly correlated with business cycles - Construction and Trade (retail) 
 
Arsov and Navmoski (2016) stated that firms investing more heavily in fixed assets 
have shown higher levels of leverage, even though their sample selection consisted in only 4 
countries. Nevertheless, previous studies, such as Talberg et al. (2008), corroborate with this 
conclusion, which gives us reason to test the following hypothesis:   
H5: The decrease in the level of leverage after privatizations is lower for firms inserted in 
capital intensive industries 
 
3.2 Data and Sample Selection 
The sample comprises 574 firm-year observations from 67 European privatized firms, 
24 of which currently listed on a public stock exchange. The list of privatized firms was taken 
from the Privatization Barometer database1 and the accounting data was obtained from the 
database Amadeus Bureau Van Dijk for private firms and from Bloomberg for publicly 
traded firms. The privatization of these firms occurred from 2009 through to 2013 and the 
period for the financial statements data ranges from 2006 to 2015. Firms were excluded from 
the sample because: i) the accounting data did not provide observations from at least two 
years before and after the privatization; ii) some privatization deals that are registered on the 
Privatization Barometer database ended up not happening; iii) other firms listed on this 
                                                          





database were already fully private, before the period of study. For this research, the goal 
was to have a uniform and diverse sample, without the presence of privatization programs. 
For this reason, Polish firms were excluded from this sample, since the country underwent a 
massive privatization plan from 2008 until 2012 and therefore, could have a big influence in 
our results. This case will be treated separately and analyzed on Section 5. Regarding the 
countries that are included in the sample, it is important to note that Italy accounts for the 
most observations.  When it comes to the industries present in the sample, the one with the 
most observations is the Utilities industry. Table 1 describes the countries and the industries 
that are included in this study. 
 
4 Methodology 
4.1 Measuring Leverage 
Leverage can be defined as a ratio of debt to total assets. Across the literature, the 
definition of this variable can have slight differences. Boubakri and Cosset (2013) and Frank 
and Goyal (2009) consider that leverage ratios should take into account both short-term and 
long-term debt. Other authors such as Talberg et al (2008) and Chahyadi (2008) argue that 
only long-term debt should be considered for the measure of leverage, because trade credit 
is associated with short-term debt and can influence the operations of the firm. Keeping in 
mind that the industry component is also present and different industries display different 
characteristics, also when it comes to debt usage, in this research the focus will be on the 
following ratio: 








4.2 Econometric Approach 
Most empirical studies present in the literature regarding privatized firms’ 
performance carry out the Wilcoxon signed-rank test in order to analyze the impact of 
privatization on the variables in study (e.g., D’ Souza and Megginson, 1999; Arcas and 
Bachiller, 2008; Harper,2002) . In this research, as the main objective is to test the effect of 
privatization on capital structure over time, we considered that it was adequate to apply 
differences-in-differences models. This method allows to examine the influence of an event 
on the dependent variable by comparing the estimated averages of two groups, one before 
the event and one after the event. In this case, the event is the process of privatization. 
In order to evaluate these effects, a dummy variable was created, Privatization, which 
is equal to 1 from the year when a firm is privatized onwards, and 0 otherwise. 
 
As a starting point for the empirical study of the research question in the paper, we 
have included, in the Appendix, a graph (see Figure 1) that illustrates the effect that time has 
on the sample firms’ leverage ratio, in which a relationship was established between the mean 
of the ratio of debt to assets and t, which corresponds to the year of privatization of any firm 
in the sample. In this graph we can see the evolution of the ratio over time, starting from t-7 
until t+6. The graph begins with the debt ratio on the highest point (0.703) and it decreases 
until t-3 (0.609). The average debt ratio goes up until t (0.636), where it starts decreasing 
again until t+2 (0.601), rising until t+4 (0.611) and finally decreasing, reaching its lowest 
point in t+6 (0.485). The main conclusion to take from this analysis is that, after privatization, 
the average debt ratio values tend to decrease over time, which is consistent with the 






To test the first research hypothesis, the following equation was estimated: 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑛𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑀𝑘𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡 +
∑ 𝛿𝑡
10




𝑧=1 𝑖𝑡𝑧𝑐                           (eq.1) 
 
where 𝛿𝑡 is the time fixed-effect variable for year t; 𝜑𝑧 is  the industry fixed-effect 
specification for industry z and 𝛾𝑐 is the country fixed-effect variable for country c. 
LEVERAGE represents the measure of leverage explained above. To control for firms’ 
characteristics, common capital structure determinants present in the literature were used as 
variables. EBITm is equal to the ratio of EBIT to sales and, according to Hall et al. (2000), 
can be used as a proxy for profitability. LN ASSETS is the logarithm of the total assets of the 
firm and is used as an approximation for the firm’s size. FIXED ASSETS is equal to the ratio 
between fixed assets and total assets of the firm. EFFICIENCY is denoted as the ratio of sales 
to assets and is used as a proxy for efficiency. Also, some country level variables were 
included. GDP is equal to the logarithm of the yearly GDP. MONEY SUPPLY is defined as 
the ratio of a country’s money supply to the GDP2. MARKET CAPITALIZATION is defined 
as the total value of all listed shares in a country’s stock market divided by the GDP. These 
three country level variables were included to verify if the growth of a country’s economy, 
the improvement of the access of the financial system and the development of the financial 
markets are indeed important factors on capital structure ratios. All firm-specific and country-
                                                          






specific control variables will be applied in every equation. The standard errors were 
computed using White’s robust procedure. Table 2 shows the definitions of all variables. 
 
To test the second research hypothesis, we added the interaction 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ×  𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 in which Type is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a firm is 
privatized through asset sale and 0 if it is privatized through share issue. The equation is 
presented below: 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 +
∑ 𝛿𝑡
10




𝑧=1 𝑖𝑡𝑧𝑐  
     (eq.2) 
To test the third research hypothesis, we added the interaction 
𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ×  𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 , which is an interaction term between Privatization and the dummy 
Partial, which is equal to 1 if the privatization is partial and is equal to 0 if the firm is fully 
privatized and also the interaction term 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ×  𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 × 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒, which is 
a variable that describes the percentage of privatization for each firm. This is a similar 
approach to Borisova and Megginson (2011). The equation is the following:  
 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙_𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 +
∑ 𝛿𝑡
10




𝑧=1 𝑖𝑡𝑧𝑐  
        





To evaluate the impact of an industry on leverage after privatization, a new variable 
was included, 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ×  𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 . This variable consists on an interaction between 
Privatization and each industry present in the sample. The equation is presented below: 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑧 +
𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝑡
10




𝑧=1 𝑖𝑡𝑧𝑐  
                (eq.4) 
Finally, to test the relationship between capital structure and capital intensive 
industries, an interaction variable was created, 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ×  𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 ×
𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠, and it consists on the interaction between the dummy Privatization, the 
different industries and the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. The equation is presented 
below: 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑧 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝑡
10





𝑐=1 + 𝑖𝑡𝑧𝑐  
 
                    (eq.5) 
 
4.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for variables used in the equations 
depicted above. In this sample, the mean (median) firm presents a leverage ratio of 62.4% 
(63.4 %) and a standard deviation of 0.272. In addition to that, Panel A provides data for sub-
samples regarding privatization. In this sample, the average (median) firm that is privatized 





through share issue has a mean (median) leverage ratio of 63.81% (68.92%). A fully 
privatized firm shows an average (median) debt ratio of 61.28% (61.09%) and a firm that is 
partially privatized presents a mean (median) leverage ratio of 63.4% (65.03%). Regarding 
the proportion of fixed assets of the firms in the full sample, we find that the average firm, 
out of the total assets, allocates 50% to fixed assets. Table 3 – Panel B presents the t-test for 
the comparison of the debt levels before and after privatization. In this table, we can see that 
the levels of debt before privatization are higher, suggesting that privatization has a negative 
effect on leverage. Panel B also presents the debt ratio means before and after privatization, 
for each of the countries included in this study. We can notice that, based on this sample, 10 
countries registered, on average, a decrease in the leverage ratios following privatization and 
the remaining countries, on average, increased their leverage levels, after privatization. If we 
examine closely, we can infer that the most developed economies exhibit lower leverage 
ratios after privatization, consistent with Harper (2002).  
Table 4 presents the Pearson correlation matrix for the variables used in the empirical 
models. Most of the variables are not significantly correlated with the dependent variable 
except for FIXED ASSETS, EBITm, LN ASSETS and GDP. Comparing to the academic 
literature, most of the measures have a consistent relationship but there is one variable whose 
coefficient of correlation is the inverse of what would be expected. With this sample, the 
correlation between LEVERAGE and FIXED ASSETS is negative (-0.139), meaning that a 
firm that is more dependent on fixed assets is expected to have less leverage. 
 





5.1 Leverage Ratio after Privatization 
The first research hypothesis aims to test whether the capital structure of a firm 
contain less debt following the process of privatization. The results observed in Table 5 are 
as expected, given that the coefficient Privatization is negative, which is consistent with the 
existent literature (e.g Boubakri and Cosset, 1998; Arcas and Bachiller, 2008). However, this 
result is inconclusive, given that there is no statistical significance. This means that there is 
no evidence to support the argument that the process of privatization can explain variations 
in firms’ leverage ratios. When it comes to the control variables, we can observe that 
EBITM’s coefficient is negative, suggesting that more profitable firms exhibit lower levels 
of leverage, which is consistent with Hall et al. (2000) and Boubakri and Cosset (2013). For 
LN ASSETS, there is evidence for a positive association between size and leverage. This was 
expected according to Faulkender and Petersen (2006), given that bigger firms are more 
diversified and face less risk, and therefore, the expected costs of bankruptcy and the 
probability of distress are lower. In addition to that, larger firms may have a stronger position 
to negotiate their financing needs (Degryse et al., 2012). The variable FIXED ASSETS 
exhibits a negative although not significant coefficient, which is in contrast with existent 
literature. Regarding efficiency, we observe a negative coefficient, as in Berger and 
Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006). The authors claim that more efficient firms may use more equity 
to protect future income derived from higher efficiency from the possibility of liquidation. 
Moving on to the country-specific variables, in line with Hanousek and Shamshur (2011), 
GDP presents a statistically positive coefficient. Having a higher GDP usually reflects a more 
developed economy and, therefore, more business investment and more possibilities for a 





though it is not statistically significant, we can observe a positive relationship with leverage. 
This is consistent with Mokhova and Zinecker (2014). According to the authors, increasing 
the supply of money is associated to lower interest rates and, consequently, to a lower cost 
of debt. This factor provides firms with opportunities to access debt markets, and thus 
increase leverage ratios. The coefficient for MARKET CAPITALIZATION is negative but it 
is not statistically significant, which is consistent with Bokpin (2009). This variable is a proxy 
for equity markets’ development and, as the equity market gets more developed, the easier a 
firm will access such markets and, therefore, one can suggest that the public access to debt 
markets would be reduced, leading to lower debt ratios. 
 
5.2 Leverage Ratio and the Type of Privatization 
In the second research hypothesis we examine the effect on leverage for privatizations 
through asset sale, as opposed to a firm privatized through share issue. The findings present 
in Table 6 are inconclusive for Privatization_type. Even though this is not the predicted 
result, this result brings no conclusion as to whether the type of privatization is relevant to 
explain debt ratio variations.  
 
5.3 Leverage and Ownership Structure 
The third research hypothesis assesses whether a partially privatized firm exhibit 
higher leverage ratios than those that are fully privatized. The findings in Table 6 show that 
the results are inconclusive, as both variables that were added for this hypothesis are not 
statistically significant. The output shows a negative sign on the coefficient for the variable 





Privatization_partial_perc. The signs are consistent with the hypothesis but again, we can’t 
conclude as to whether the ownership structure, after privatization, can impact firms’ 
leverage ratios.   
 
5.4 Leverage and Industry Influence 
The fourth research hypothesis tests the influence of the industry in which a firm is 
inserted on its capital structure, through a series of regressions containing an interaction term 
between Privatization and each of the industries present in the sample. The output is 
presented in Table 7 and the results show positive coefficients for half of the industries in the 
sample (Trade, Transport, Services, Telecommunications and Construction) and negative 
coefficients for the other half (Finance, Real Estate, Utilities, Natural Resources, 
Manufacturing) . The outcomes suggest that the Telecommunications industry is the most 
affected after privatization, with an expected increase on the leverage ratio of 15.8%, after 
privatization. This result is not consistent with Berman and Pfleeger (1997), as they found 
evidence for the Telecommunications industry to be among the least correlated with business 
cycles. Looking at the negative coefficients, we can observe that the industry whose effect 
of privatization is stronger is the Finance industry, with an expected reduction on the debt 
ratio of 10.2%, after privatization. When it comes to the industries referred in the hypothesis, 
there was evidence for the Construction industry to have a positive relationship with leverage, 
with an expected increase of 7%. We found no statistical evidence for the Trade industry to 






5.5 Leverage and Capital Intensive Industries 
The final hypothesis in Table 8 assesses whether industries that are more intensive in 
fixed assets exhibit a different variation in the level of leverage following privatizations. 
Given that capital intensive firms are characterized for higher depreciation and more fixed 
assets, in this study the industries that are marked as capital intensive are: Real Estate; 
Utilities; Telecommunications and Transportation.  To define capital intensive industries was 
to divide the fixed assets totals per industry by the number of firms present in each industry, 
in order to find the average proportion of fixed assets per firm in each industry. The industries 
selected have on average, at least two billion euros in fixed assets per firm. The results show 
that half of the industries have positive coefficients on the interaction variable between each 
industry, FIXED ASSETS and Privatization. Out of the four industries that are identified as 
capital intensive, only Real Estate has a negative coefficient. Nevertheless, we observe that 
the interaction terms with the Transportation and Telecommunications industries are 
statistically significant. These results are the expected results and they suggest that firms 
more dependent on fixed assets have more leverage, after privatization. Rampini and 
Viswanathan (2013) add that firms with low leverage are essentially firms with few tangible 
assets, due to the strong and positive relationship between leased capital and asset tangibility.   
 
5.6 Case Study - Poland 
Given that with the main sample only the main research hypothesis was validated, we 
opted for an additional analysis specific for massive programs of privatization. Therefore, we 
focus on the Polish case to understand and how the firms’ debt ratios are affected by a large 





launched in 2008 a plan whose main objective was to reduce the ownership role of the 
government in all industries. (Patena and Błaszczyk, 2016).  
In this privatization program, 802 state-owned firms were included in the plan and, 
until 2011, 458 were fully privatized. Firms from industries in several sectors, ranging from 
Utilities, Transportation, Pharmaceuticals, etc. were covered by this program. 
The sample for the analysis comprises 634 firms from 12 industries. Figure 2 
describes the evolution of the sample firms’ leverage ratios over time. It shows that before 
privatization, the mean debt ratios never surpassed 50% and after privatization, the average 
debt levels increase, suggesting that debt ratios tend to increase over time, contrary to what 
was concluded in Section 3.  
Table 9 shows the output for the main hypothesis and for the hypotheses concerning 
the privatization type and the ownership structure. The results show a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient on the variable Privatization, for Polish privatizations. 
This suggests that, after privatization, a firm will have an expected increase on the debt levels 
of 12.5%. Patena and Błaszczyk (2016) claim that managers of Polish state-owned 
enterprises were very conservative regarding the use of debt. Analyzing the effect on leverage 
from privatizations through asset sale versus equity market, we found evidence for higher 
debt ratios for firms privatized through asset sale, in 26.9%, when compared to a firm 
privatized through share issue. This result is consistent with Megginson et al (2004). The 
authors found evidence that firms are more likely to be privatized through SIPs when 
profitability is higher. Regarding ownership structure, evidence is inconclusive as to whether 
the type of ownership has an influence on debt ratios, as both coefficients are not statistically 





found evidence that after privatization, industries more dependent on fixed assets tend to 
have more leverage, when compared to firms that are less capital-intensive. 
From this analysis, we can document that the Polish large-scale privatization program 
launched by the government can explain the changes on leverage ratios by the firms, which 
gives us reason to suggest that political approaches to privatization may be important to 
explain firms’ capital structure decisions, as we could not reach any conclusions regarding 
the main sample in the study. Moreover, risk aversion characteristics of managers before 
privatizations may well be a driver for changes in leverage from privatizations, as suggested 
by Patena and Błaszczyk (2016). 
 
5.7 Robustness Check 
To assess the robustness of our findings, the sample was encompassed into an equally 
distant period of time, before and after privatization, to see if the model is well-structured 
and can be used for a shorter period of time. This was tested on the main model and the time 
span selected was 3 years before and after privatization. The output is presented in Table 10 
and, when compared to the results presented in Table 5, we can see that the initial conclusions 
are not altered. Table 10 also presents the results for the Polish sample and, comparing to 
table 9, we notice that the coefficients are robust and the conclusions are the same, suggesting 








The aim of this study is to analyze the impact of the process of privatization on capital 
structure decisions, while also analyzing the different industry characteristics and how capital 
structure varies from industry to industry. To do so, we tested five hypotheses on a sample 
with 574 observations from 10 industries and 18 European countries, for a period between 
2006 and 2015. In order to catch the effects of privatization on capital structure over time, a 
differences-in-differences model was applied. 
The findings in this study suggest that overall, there is no evidence for the effect of 
privatization to be significant on leverage ratios, unless there is a planned privatization 
program for several firms, as shown in the case of Poland. The result is not consistent with 
the hypothesis, as the literature suggests that there is a decrease of the leverage ratio. 
Furthermore, we did find evidence for an increase of leverage for Polish firms, after 
privatization. Additionally, no evidence was found to say that ownership structure is relevant 
to explain capital structure decisions after the process of privatization. 
Regarding the influence of industry characteristics on capital structure, the results 
suggest that, following privatization, firms inserted in capital intensive industries tend to have 
more leverage against firms less dependent on fixed assets, after privatization. This outcome 
supports the literature (Talberg et al., 2008; Rampini and Viswanathan, 2013), based on the 
fact that firms more dependent on fixed assets have more leverage overall. 
This paper makes a contribution to the literature, in the sense that our findings suggest 
that the political context in which a country is inserted regarding privatizations may be 
important to explain capital structure decisions on firms.  Despite the contribution, further 
research can be made. One suggestion is to include the concept of market leverage and verify 





that Patena and Błaszczyk (2016) suggested that managers’ characteristics could explain 
leverage variations, after privatization, a behavioral variable such as the managers’ influence 
on capital structure decisions could be interesting to include. The economic cycles were 
briefly approached in this paper. It could be interesting to study the effects of privatization 
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Figure 1 - Debt ratio evolution on the sample firms, over time 
 




















































Table 1 – Countries and Industries present in the sample 
Country Observations Percentage  Industry Observations Percentage 
Germany 37 6.45  Finance 46 8.01 
Italy 91 15.85  Real Estate 7 1.22 
Portugal 62 10.80  Utilities 133 23.17 
Sweden 70 12.20  Trade 15 2.61 
United Kingdom 43 7.49  Transportation 111 19.34 
Belgium 27 4.70  Services 124 21.60 
France 39 6.79  Natural Resources 7 1.22 
Slovenia 10 1.74  Telecommunications 27 4.70 
Spain 46 8.01  Manufacturing 94 16.38 
Netherlands 25 4.36  Construction 10 1.74 
Luxembourg 7 1.22  Total 574 100.00 
Ireland 10 1.74        
Greece 46 8.01        
Finland 19 3.31        
Czech Republic 18 3.14        
Estonia 8 1.39        
Lithuania 6 1.05        
Hungary 10 1.74        
Total 574 100.00        
 













Table 2 - Variable Definition 
        
Variable         Definition     
        
LEVERAGE    Ratio of total debt over total 
assets.      
     
EBITM    Ratio of EBIT to sales. Proxy 
for profitability.      
     
LN ASSETS    Size of the firm, measured by 
the logarithm of total assets.      
     
FIXED ASSETS    Ratio of fixed assets to total 
assets.      
     
EFFICIENCY    Ratio of sales to assets. 
Proxy for efficiency.      
     
GDP    Logarithm of GDP. 
     
MONEY SUPPLY    Ratio of a country’s 
money supply to the GDP.      
     
MARKET 
CAPITALIZATION    Total value of all listed 
shares in a stock market as a 
percentage of GDP. 
     
     
     
Privatization    Dummy variable equal to 1 
from the year when a firm is 
privatized until the end of the 
sample (2013) and 0, 
otherwise. 
     
     
     
     




which is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if a firm is 
privatized through asset 
     
     
     
     
     





     
sale and 0 if it is privatized 
through share issue. 
Privatization_partial    Interaction between 
Privatization and the 
dummy partial, which is 
equal to 1 if the 
privatization is partial and 
is equal to 0 if the firm is 
fully privatized. 
     
     
     
     
     
        
        
        
        
        
Privatization_partial_perc   Interaction between 
Privatization, partial and 
partial_percentage, which 
is a variable that describes 
the percentage of 
privatization for each firm. 
     
     
     
     
     
Privatization_industry   Interaction between 
Privatization and each 
industry present in the 
sample. 
     
     
     
Privatization_industry_fa   
Interaction between the 
dummy Privatization, the 
different industries and 
FIXED ASSETS. 
     
     
     
     
i     Firm. 
     
z     Industry in which the firm is 
inserted.      
     
c     Country in which the firm is 
based.      
     
t     Year of data. 






Table 3 – Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Regression Variables 










         
Dependent Variable       
         
Leverage 574 0.6235 0.2717 0.0075 0.4681 0.6342 0.7722 2.6622 
         
Controls        
         
LnAssets 574 19.7436 2.9566 13.1056 17.5476 19.4255 21.8345 27.2972 
FixedAssets 574 0.4990 0.2670 0.0007 0.2815 0.5006 0.6944 0.9937 
EBITm 574 0.0873 0.2436 -1.3223 0.0065 0.0646 0.1731 1.5705 
Efficiency 574 0.8031 0.7532 0.0004 0.2414 0.5843 1.2117 4.9370 
GDP 574 27.0135 1.2260 23.3727 25.9328 26.8259 28.1209 28.7405 
MoneySupply 574 0.9286 0.3397 0.3962 0.7158 0.8912 1.0504 3.9911 
MktCapGDP 574 0.6154 0.3646 0.0847 0.2949 0.5124 0.8817 2.2467 
 
Notes: This table presents the descriptive statistics for the variables that were applied in this study. 
 Special Cases 










         
Dependent Variable       
Leverage, if 
type = SIP 
174 0.6381 0.194 0.0541 0.5296 0.6892 0.7553 0.9635 
Leverage, if 
type = Asset 
Sale 
400 0.6184 0.2993 0.0075 0.4213 0.6051 0.8029 2.6622 
Leverage, if 
Full 261 0.6128 0.2152 0.1179 0.4715 0.6109 0.7603 1.6922 
Leverage, if 
Partial 








Panel B: Debt Ratios before and after Privatization 
 
 T-test for the mean differences 
Before After Diff. 
T-
Statistic 
0.6400 0.6093 0.0307 (1.36) 
 
 
 Debt Ratios before and after Privatization, by country 
Country 
Before After 
N Mean N Mean 
Germany 17 0.7119 20 0.6376 
Italy 46 0.6965 45 0.6707 
Portugal 35 0.6783 27 0.7309 
Sweden 36 0.6117 34 0.5109 
United Kingdom 20 0.6139 23 0.611 
Belgium 18 0.5903 9 0.6296 
France 15 0.8215 26 0.7241 
Slovenia 4 0.4843 6 0.6157 
Spain 27 0.5389 19 0.5817 
Netherlands 7 0.7718 18 0.6848 
Luxembourg 3 0.4057 4 0.2618 
Ireland 5 1.0079 5 1.0203 
Greece 21 0.7987 24 0.5844 
Finland 8 0.6138 11 0.6154 
Czech Republic 7 0.2318 11 0.1271 
Estonia 2 0.1304 6 0.3581 
Lithuania 4 0.1142 2 0.2106 
Hungary 7 0.455 3 0.4098 
 











             
             
 Leverage Fixed 
Assets 
EBITm Partial Ln 
Assets 
Efficiency Industry Privatization 
Type 




Leverage 1            
Fixed Assets -0.139*** 1           
EBITm -0.0848* 0.176*** 1          
Partial 0.0370 -0.0185 
-
0.151*** 
1         
Ln Assets 0.233*** 0.0202 0.350*** 0.0894* 1        





1       















0.317*** 0.293*** 1     
Privatization -0.0515 -0.00761 -0.0318 -0.0328 -0.0190 -0.0306 -0.0312 0.0836* 1    
GDP 0.197*** -0.103* 0.0970* 0.0243 -0.0224 0.156*** -0.0586 0.107* 0.0473 1   
Money Supply 0.0592 -0.0396 -0.0479 
-
0.170*** 
-0.0167 0.227*** 0.0675 0.111** 0.0496 0.0920* 1  
Market 
Capitalization 



















Ln Assets 0.014*** 
 (0.004) 






Money Supply 0.083 
 (0.160) 
Market Capitalization -0.095 
 (0.107) 
Time Effects YES 
Industry Effects YES 





Adjusted R2 0.331 
  
Notes: This table presents estimated coefficients for LEVERAGE = c + β1PRIVATIZATION + β2EBITM + 
β3LN ASSETS + β4FIXED ASSETS + β5EFFICIENCY + β6GDP + β7MONEY SUPPLY + β8MARKET 
CAPITALIZATION + ∑ 𝛿𝑡
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𝑧=1 𝑖𝑡𝑧𝑐  
The dependent variable is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.1, 









Table 6 – Effect of the Privatization Type and the Ownership Stucture on Capital 
Structure, after Privatization 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Leverage Leverage  
Privatization_type -0.033  
 (0.032)  
Privatization_partial  -0.003 
  (0.047) 
Privatization_partial_perc  0.058 
  (0.139) 
Privatization -0.013 -0.048 
 (0.046) (0.041) 
EBITm -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Ln Assets 0.013*** 0.015*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) 
Fixed Assets -0.061 -0.062 
 (0.052) (0.052) 
Efficiency -0.060*** -0.057*** 
 (0.018) (0.020) 
GDP 0.330* 0.333* 
 (0.174) (0.175) 
Money Supply 0.085 0.078 
 (0.160) (0.163) 
Market Capitalization -0.098 -0.089 
 (0.108) (0.110) 
Time Effects YES YES 
Industry Effects YES YES 
Country Effects YES YES 
Constant -8.787* -8.926* 
 (4.982) (4.985) 
Observations 568 568 
R2 0.383 0.383 
Adjusted R2 0.331 0.330 
 
Notes: Equation (1) presents estimated coefficients for LEVERAGE = c + β1D_PRIVATIZATION_TYPE + 
β2D_PRIVATIZATION + CONTROLS + εticz,. Equation (2) presents estimated coefficients for LEVERAGE = 
c + β1PRIVATIZATION_PARTIAL + β2PRIVATIZATION_PARTIAL_PERC + β3PRIVATIZATION + 
CONTROLS + εticz. The control variables used in the first equation are also used in the subsequent equations. 
The dependent variable is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.1, 








Table 7 – Industry Influence on Capital Structure after Privatization 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage 
Privatization -0.028 -0.037 -0.028 -0.037 -0.058 
 (0.044) (0.043) (0.047) (0.043) (0.043) 
Privatization_finance -0.102**     
 (0.048)     
Privatization_realestate  -0.008    
  (0.087)    
Privatization_utilities   -0.036   
   (0.046)   
Privatization_trade    0.004  
    (0.182)  
Privatization_transport     0.099*** 
     (0.037) 
EBITm -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Ln Assets 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Fixed Assets -0.057 -0.064 -0.063 -0.064 -0.058 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
Efficiency -0.059*** -0.060*** -0.059*** -0.060*** -0.061*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
GDP 0.365** 0.338* 0.336* 0.337* 0.354** 
 (0.175) (0.174) (0.175) (0.173) (0.173) 
Money Supply 0.069 0.084 0.086 0.083 0.052 
 (0.159) (0.160) (0.160) (0.160) (0.159) 
Market Capitalization -0.078 -0.095 -0.105 -0.096 -0.081 
 (0.107) (0.108) (0.108) (0.103) (0.107) 
Time Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant -9.737* -9.047* -8.988* -9.019* -9.482* 
 (4.983) (4.971) (4.987) (4.950) (4.951) 
Observations 568 568 568 568 568 
R2 0.384 0.382 0.382 0.382 0.387 







Table 7 – Industry Influence on Capital Structure after Privatization (cont.) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage 
Privatization -0.039 -0.035 -0.043 -0.025 -0.038 
 (0.040) (0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043) 
Privatization_services 0.013     
 (0.056)     
Privatization_natresces  -0.091    
  (0.130)    
Privatization_telecom   0.158***   
   (0.059)   
Privatization_manufac    -0.083*  
    (0.050)  
Privatization_construct     0.071* 
     (0.040) 
EBITm -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Ln Assets 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Fixed Assets -0.063 -0.064 -0.064 -0.064 -0.064 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
Efficiency -0.059*** -0.060*** -0.061*** -0.059*** -0.060*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
GDP 0.339** 0.339* 0.345** 0.330* 0.337* 
 (0.173) (0.174) (0.172) (0.173) (0.174) 
Money Supply 0.088 0.085 0.066 0.063 0.079 
 (0.160) (0.160) (0.157) (0.160) (0.161) 
Market Capitalization -0.098 -0.096 -0.098 -0.107 -0.097 
 (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.108) (0.108) 
Time Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant -9.078* -9.080* -9.237* -8.798* -9.016* 
 (4.932) (4.961) (4.919) (4.943) (4.960) 
Observations 568 568 568 568 568 
R2 0.382 0.382 0.385 0.385 0.382 
Adjusted R2 0.330 0.330 0.333 0.333 0.330 
Notes: This table presents estimated coefficients for LEVERAGE = c + β1PRIVATIZATION + 
β2PRIVATIZATION_INDUSTRYitz + CONTROLS + εticz, in which the control variables used in the first 
equation are also used in the subsequent equations. The dependent variable is the ratio of total debt to total 







Table 8 – Capital Intensive Industries and Capital Structure, after Privatization 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage 
Privatization -0.030 -0.037 -0.040 -0.036 -0.063 
 (0.044) (0.043) (0.046) (0.043) (0.043) 
Privatization_finance_industry_fa -0.183**     
 (0.078)     
Privatization_realestate_industry_fa  -0.008    
  (0.089)    
Privatization_utilities_industry_fa   0.020   
   (0.064)   
Privatization_trade_industry_fa    -0.047  
    (0.228)  
Privatization_transport_industry_fa     0.265*** 
     (0.053) 
EBITm -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Ln Assets 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Fixed Assets -0.042 -0.064 -0.065 -0.064 -0.094* 
 (0.053) (0.051) (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) 
Efficiency -0.057*** -0.060*** -0.060*** -0.060*** -0.063*** 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
GDP 0.348** 0.338* 0.338* 0.342** 0.360** 
 (0.173) (0.174) (0.173) (0.173) (0.172) 
Money Supply 0.086 0.084 0.082 0.087 0.038 
 (0.159) (0.160) (0.161) (0.159) (0.157) 
Market Capitalization -0.088 -0.095 -0.093 -0.091 -0.091 
 (0.106) (0.108) (0.108) (0.103) (0.107) 
Time Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant -9.294* -9.048* -9.045* -9.151* -9.591* 
 (4.930) (4.971) (4.952) (4.941) (4.912) 
Observations 568 568 568 568 568 
R2 0.384 0.382 0.382 0.382 0.392 









Table 8 – Capital Intensive Industries and Capital Structure, after Privatization 
(cont.) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage Leverage 
Privatization -0.039 -0.035 -0.044 -0.027 -0.038 
 (0.039) (0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043) 
Privatization_services_industry_fa  0.021     
 (0.105)     
Privatization_natresces_industry_fa  -0.179    
  (0.281)    
Privatization_telecom_industry_fa   0.328***   
   (0.102)   
Privatization_manufac_industry_fa    -0.162  
    (0.109)  
Privatization_construct_industry_fa     0.191 
     (0.126) 
EBITm -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Ln Assets 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Fixed Assets -0.067 -0.064 -0.068 -0.063 -0.064 
 (0.046) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
Efficiency -0.059*** -0.060*** -0.061*** -0.059*** -0.060*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
GDP 0.340** 0.339* 0.369** 0.329* 0.338* 
 (0.173) (0.174) (0.173) (0.173) (0.174) 
Money Supply 0.086 0.085 0.073 0.064 0.081 
 (0.160) (0.160) (0.156) (0.160) (0.161) 
Market Capitalization -0.095 -0.096 -0.090 -0.105 -0.096 
 (0.108) (0.107) (0.106) (0.108) (0.107) 
Time Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Country Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant -9.105* -9.080* -9.927** -8.777* -9.021* 
 (4.931) (4.962) (4.928) (4.949) (4.960) 
Observations 568 568 568 568 568 
R2 0.382 0.382 0.387 0.384 0.382 
Adjusted R2 0.330 0.330 0.335 0.332 0.330 
 
Notes: This table presents estimated coefficients for LEVERAGE = c + β1PRIVATIZATION + 
β2PRIVATIZATION_INDUSTRY_FAi + CONTROLS + εticz, in which the control variables used in the first 
equation are also used in the subsequent equations. The dependent variable is the ratio of total debt to total 





Table 9 – Polish Case Study 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Leverage Leverage Leverage 
Privatization 0.125*** -0.067 0.183*** 
 (0.039) (0.043) (0.053) 
Privatization_type  0.269***  
  (0.044)  
Privatization_partial   -0.061 
   (0.069) 
Privatization_partial_perc   -0.018 
   (0.089) 
EBITm -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Ln Assets 0.010 0.020*** 0.009 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Fixed Assets 0.179*** 0.191*** 0.177*** 
 (0.058) (0.057) (0.059) 
Efficiency 0.047** 0.050** 0.044** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) 
GDP 0.960 0.979 0.962 
 (2.049) (2.017) (1.996) 
Money Supply -2.747 -2.966 -2.749 
 (5.344) (5.262) (5.208) 
Market Capitalization -0.144 -0.331 -0.142 
 (0.695) (0.690) (0.690) 
Time Effects YES YES YES 
Industry Effects YES YES YES 
Country Effects NO NO NO 
Constant -23.567 -24.036 -23.616 
 (51.500) (50.703) (50.167) 
Observations 634 634 634 
R2 0.217 0.257 0.220 
Adjusted R2 0.184 0.225 0.186 
 
Notes: This table presents estimated coefficients from the equations relative to H1, H2 and H3, for the sample 
of polish firms. The dependent variable is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Robust standard errors in 






Table 10 – Time Span Analysis (H1) – Robustness Check 
 
 Non Polish Firms Polish Firms 
 Leverage Leverage 
Privatization -0.034 0.138*** 
 (0.051) (0.042) 
EBITm -0.005*** -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
Ln Assets 0.018** 0.011 
 (0.007) (0.010) 
Fixed Assets 0.036 0.151* 
 (0.094) (0.083) 
Efficiency -0.022 0.025 
 (0.036) (0.021) 
GDP 0.317 -2.942 
 (0.275) (4.089) 
Money Supply 0.286 2.985 
 (0.275) (6.440) 
Market Capitalization -0.148 -2.892 
 (0.140) (2.303) 
Time Effects YES YES 
Industry Effects YES YES 
Country Effects YES YES 
Constant -8.819 78.201 
 (7.828) (106.150) 
Observations 313 333 
R2 0.399 0.223 
Adjusted R2 0.303 0.163 
 
Notes: This table presents estimated coefficients for LEVERAGE = c + β1PRIVATIZATION  + CONTROLS + 
εticz, in which the control variables used in the first equation are also used in the subsequent equations. The 
dependent variable is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.1, ** p 
< 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
